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Introduction
Strong incentives often have dysfunctional consequences. CIA …eld agents rewarded on the number of spies recruited fail to invest in developing high quality spies (WMD Commission Report, 2005, p. 159) . Civil servants rewarded on outcomes in training programs screen out those who may most need the program (Anderson et al. (1993) and Cragg (1997) ). Teachers cheat when schools are rewarded on student test scores (Jacob and Levitt, 2003) . A theoretical literature going back at least thirty years (see, for instance, Kerr (1975) , Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , and Baker (1992) ) has studied the possibility of dysfunctional responses to incentives in di¤erent settings. Essentially, as Baker (1992) carefully argues, when output is not clearly observed, what matters is the correlation, on the margin, between what is rewarded and the desired action.
Dysfunctional responses may occur not only in cases of individual incentive contracts but also in tournament settings where individuals compete with each other and are rewarded on a relative performance basis. In these settings, strong incentives can be particularly damaging if agents can devote resources not only to productive activities but also to depressing each other's output. As Lazear (1989) argues, when rewards depend only on their relative performance, agents may respond to stronger incentives by actively sabotaging their rivals, i.e. by undertaking actions that adversely a¤ect others'output. 1 While tournaments are pervasive in organizations, and anecdotal accounts of "back-stabbing,"bad-mouthing, and other sabotage activities are easy to …nd, there does not exist any systematic work documenting such responses. In particular, we are not aware of any empirical work on tournaments that involves the possibility of multiple activities, especially when some actions are aimed at reducing others'output. An obvious reason why such actions are usually impossible to document is that workers who sabotage their fellow workers'performance typically go to great lengths 1 to conceal these actions.
In this paper, however, we provide such empirical evidence. We do this by exploiting an incentive change in a sports context, where both productive and sabotage activities can be directly observed. 2 Teams that engage in league competition (round-robin tournaments) have historically been rewarded with 2 points for winning a match, 1 point for tying, and no points for losing. In the run up to the soccer World Cup that was to take place in the US in 1994, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), which is the governing body of the game, decided to change the reward for the winning team from 2 points to 3 points while leaving the reward for ties and losses unchanged. The objective of FIFA, worried about the possibility of empty stadiums in the US, was to "encourage attacking, high-scoring matches." 3 This change subsequently became part of the Laws of the Game and was applied after 1995 to all league competitions worldwide. 4 We use a detailed data set on soccer matches in Spain before and after the change to study the impact of this change in rewards along a number of dimensions. In this context, following Lazear (1989) , we call sabotage any e¤ort that is intended to reduce the performance of the rival in the tournament. In particular, we focus our analysis on all such actions that are perceived as "dirty play"and penalized in di¤erent ways in the Laws of the Game. Our setting has two key advantages. First, sabotage is observable. We have information on the type of specialists in di¤erent actions (productive and destructive) that teams choose to …eld. More importantly, both productive actions aimed at increasing one's own output and destructive actions aimed at decreasing the opponents'output are observable and are routinely recorded in newspapers and box scores. Second, we can take advantage of an unusual control group: the very same teams that engage 2 In recent years, sports contexts have been succesfully studied in the literature to test predictions about individual behavior. These include corruption, discrimination, the e¤ects of police on crime, the Coase theorem, Nash equilibrium, and others. See, for instance, Walker and Wooders (2001) , Duggan and Levitt (2002) , Chiappori et al (2003) , and other references therein.
3 See, for example, "FIFA o¢ cials'goal: Encourage attacking, high-scoring matches,"USA Today March 17, 1994, and "FIFA Approves scoring changes," L.A. Times, December 17, 1993. The L.A. Times reports: "An underlying reason for FIFA's action, and for World Cup Chairman Alan Rothenberg of the United States pushing hard for it, was the feeling that American fans, used to higher-scoring American games, would be much less tolerant and much more quickly turned o¤ than a more traditional soccer audience by an early parade of 0-0 and 1-1 results." Citing experts of the game, The New York Times ("Avoid Scoreless Ties," January 4, 1994) commented on the decision: "A decision by FIFA last June to reward teams three points for a …rst-round victory instead of two has increased optimism that teams will emphasize o¤ense and produce a scoring spectacle in the World Cup."
4 Professional soccer leagues in England had already implemented this change in the reward schedule in the 1982-83 season.
in league play were playing at the same time in a di¤erent tournament that experienced no changes in incentives. Using their behavior in this tournament, we can eliminate the e¤ect of any changes in styles of play or other time trends unrelated to the incentive change.
The incentive change we study should lead teams to try harder to win. This may result in two types of actions, as Lazear's (1989) model predicts: teams may undertake more o¤ensive actions, but they may also play "dirtier,"as it now becomes more important to prevent the opposing team from scoring a goal. Stronger incentives may then lead to more sabotage. For example, tackling an opponent may reduce his likelihood of scoring, but also poses an important physical risk to both players. An increase in the value of winning may thus lead to an increase in this type of e¤ort. Does then the amount of dirty play increase? And if so, is it possible to say this is "bad,"and therefore unintended, as opposed to providing simply a more intense, and perhaps even more fun, game? Put di¤erently, are stronger incentives detrimental to the objective of the principal?
Our analysis proceeds in four steps, as follows. First, we start by describing the basic behavioral changes that took place after the rule change. We …nd that, consistent with what we might expect, the introduction of the new incentives was followed by a decrease in the number of ties. However, the number of matches decided by a large number of goals declined. Measures of o¤ensive e¤ort such as shot attempts on goal and corner kicks increased, while indicators of sabotage activity such as fouls and unsporting behavior punished with yellow cards also increased following the change. Of course, all of these results could follow simply from time trends and, hence, they are merely suggestive.
Second, we proceed to use the control matches to estimate the e¤ects due to the change in rewards. Most, but not all, of the changes we observe in the before-after analysis are still present in the di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID) analysis we implement. We observe an increase on the order of 10% in the measures of attacking e¤ort desired by the principal. We …nd, however, that the number of fouls increased signi…cantly, by 12.5%, as a result of the incentive change. The net result of these opposing forces is that the number of goals scored did not change.
We then try to understand the underlying mechanisms through which these changes took place, and the reason they neutralized each other in terms of goal scoring, by examining the way the behavior of teams changed during the match. We expect teams that get ahead in the score by one goal to become more conservative, since allowing one goal causes them to drop two points rather than one point. On the other hand, the behavior of teams that get behind should not change a great deal, as the marginal value of one goal (tying) remains basically unchanged. 5 The evidence we …nd is consistent with this hypothesis: teams that get ahead become more conservative by signi…cantly increasing the number of defenders they use. This change in the defensive stance has two consequences: the probability of scoring an additional goal by a team that is ahead signi…cantly drops; moreover, by the end of the match, the losing team ends up making signi…cantly fewer attempts on goal than before the incentive change. Hence, the winning team successfully manages to freeze the score. The fourth and …nal step is to actually show that this change represented undesirable sabotage rather than, say, desirable greater intensity in the games. That is, we try to understand the welfare consequences of the stronger incentives that are implemented. Public statements by FIFA o¢ cials indicated that, in the spirit of Kerr (1975) , they were increasing the rewards for wins while hoping for more scoring; this we know, did not happen. Still, a more intense match could be more fun even without more goals, if the public likes the greater emphasis on defense. This was not the case. We exploit the lack of selection in the assignment of teams to stadiums given that all teams play in all stadiums and calculate the e¤ect of playing at one's home stadium against a "dirtier"team, measured in several di¤erent ways. Controlling for team …xed e¤ects, we …nd that attendance at any given stadium signi…cantly decreases when being visited by teams that play dirtier. This result is important in that it con…rms the idea that the signi…cant increase in sabotage actions we …nd is, on the margin, undesired by the public. We …nally show that, indeed, attendance at stadiums decreased as a result of the sabotage.
Overall, our study suggests, consistently with the broad empirical agency theory literature (see Gibbons (1998) and Prendergast (1999 Prendergast ( , 2002 for reviews) that soccer clubs reoptimized and changed their behavior in response to stronger incentives, but that they did this largely in a manner undesired by the principal: they engaged in more sabotage activities and managed to decrease the output desired by the principal. The beautiful game became a bit less beautiful.
6 Thus, we see our evidence as supporting incentive models with multiple tasks, where the cost of increasing incentives is encouraging more e¤ort of the "wrong"kind.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from the Spanish League competition La Liga, one of the main professional soccer leagues in the world. We use data from the 1994-95 full season (370 games), the last one with the 2-1-0 scheme, and from the 1998-99 full season (380 games) with the new 3-1-0 scheme. Using data that are four seasons apart is convenient because it does not require us to assume that teams were able to immediately adjust their behavior to the new situation. It also means that we will have to account for any possible year e¤ects in the data. To do this, we use data from the Spanish Cup competition La Copa as controls in our analysis. This competition is an elimination tournament in which teams are randomly paired together, no points are awarded, and the winner survives to the next round. All changes in rules and regulations that took place during the period of analysis apply equally to league and cup games except, of course, the change in rewards in league games. As a result, the behavior of the teams in the cup tournament should be largely una¤ected by the change in the reward scheme in the league tournament.
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The data come from Marca, which is the best selling newspaper in Spain, and from www:sportec:es. They include detailed observations of multiple measures of actions, both sabotage and the desired attacking or o¤ensive e¤ort, along with teams' choices of specialists:
1. Player types. In a soccer game each team lines up one goalkeeper and ten …eld players. Field players can be of three possible types: defenders, mid…elders or attackers. Defenders, who play closest to their own goal, which they defend when it is under attack. This often requires stopping rival players through hard tackles or other types of dirty play. Thus, they are most likely to be involved in sabotage activities. Attackers, or Forwards, are the primary scorers who play closest to the other team's goal. They are players specialized in the type of e¤ort that FIFA wants to increase. Lastly, Mid…elders play between defenders and attackers and their role is to support both of them.
We classify each of the players in every team that played in every match in the sample using the o¢ cial classi…cation of players' types published by Marca and www:sportec:es. The data include information on the number of the di¤erent types of players at the beginning of each match and during each match. This information is useful to study teams'defensive/attacking stances.
2. Actions. For every match and for every team in the sample, the data set includes information on the number of productive and destructive actions:
Fouls. In the Laws of the Game (FIFA, 2000), the following actions are sanctioned as fouls: "Tripping or attempting to trip an opponent, charging into an opponent, striking or attempting to strike an opponent, pushing an opponent, jumping at an opponent in a careless or reckless manner or using excessive force, blatant holding or pulling an opponent, and impeding the progress of an opponent." These actions are penalized in di¤erent ways.
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In addition to fouls, there are two color "cards"which the referee will hold up to indicate hard fouls and behavior which won't be tolerated:
Yellow Cards. Indicates a formal "caution" for any form of "unsporting behavior," which includes especially "hard fouls, harassment, blatant cases of holding and pulling an opposing player, persistently breaking the rules," and other similar acts. In addition to being punished as a foul, a player who receives two yellow cards is given a Red Card and ejected from the game without being replaced by a teammate.
Red Cards. These are given after a second yellow card as well as for behavior that is clearly beyond the bounds of the game such as "violent conduct, spitting at an opponent, using o¤ensive or threatening language, and use of excessive force or brutality against an opponent."
It seems apparent that these three types of actions are aimed at reducing the rivals'output. Empirically, around 85-90 percent of all such sabotage activities are fouls where players are not booked with a card, 10-15 percent are fouls where a yellow card is given, and typically less than one percent are actions punished with a red card. For the most part we will focus our attention on fouls and yellow cards.
With regard to actions aimed at scoring we have data on Shots, which are attempts on goal that ended up aimed incorrectly at the opponent's goal, and Shots on Goal, which are those that were correctly aimed at the opponent's goal. The data also include Corner Kicks, an action that is a consequence of attacking behavior: if when a team attacks, the ball goes out of bounds over the end line and was last touched by the defending team (e.g., a shot that was de ‡ected by a defender), the attacking team inbounds it from the nearest corner by kicking it in from the corner arc.
3. Other Variables. We also have data on the date of the game, the stage of the season (game number), the winning record of each team at the time of the match, stadiums' capacities, attendance at each match, and the operating budgets of each team, a proxy for the strength of a team. Lastly, our data set includes the number of goals by each team and their timing, as well as information on:
Extra time. Soccer games have two 45-minute halves, at the end of which the referee may, at his discretion, award what is often referred to as "extra time" or "injury time." Law 7 in the O¢ cial Laws of the Game states that "allowance for injury time is made in either period of play for all time lost through substitutions, assessment of injury to players, removal of injured players for treatment, wasting time, or any other cause. Allowance for time lost is at the discretion of the referee" (FIFA, 2000, p. 37) . Information on the amount of extra time that referees add on may thus be valuable as indirect, additional evidence on the amount of destructive actions that took place.
Player Substitutions. Players may be replaced by a substitute at any time during the match. Teams may use up to a maximum of three substitutes. We have information on the timing at which substitutions take place.
We begin in Figure 1 by presenting the probability distribution of score margins before and after the change. The percentage of all matches that ended in a tie decreases from 29.7 to 25.5 percent, while the number of matches decided by a single goal (whether in favor of the home or visiting team) experiences a large increase from 31 to 40 percent. In absolute terms, the number of tied games decreased from 110 to 97, the number of matches that …nished with a 1-goal di¤erence increased from 115 to 153, and those that …nished with a di¤erence of two goals or more decreased from 145 to 130. Statistically, the before and after distributions are signi…cantly di¤erent (Pearson 2 (6) = 17.28; p-value: 0.008). 9 This …rst look of the data, therefore, suggests a clear non-monotonic pattern in the outcomes: teams are less likely to tie, but they are also less likely to win by a "useless" (but possibly quite entertaining) large number of goals. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics before and after the change. This table does not account for possible year e¤ects, as it only reports changes in means, but it gives an idea of the main patterns observable in the data. It also shows that the e¤ects that we will …nd in the next section result, as we might expect, from changes in the "treatment group." We …nd, for instance, that there were statistically signi…cant and large increases in regular fouls, yellow card fouls, shots on goal, and corner kicks. With respect to match outcomes we see the drop in the proportion of ties referred to before, as well as an increase in extra time and a decrease in attendance. As indicated earlier, these results, while suggestive, could simply re ‡ect other trends in the way soccer is being played. We proceed in the next section to study the relations of these changes to the changes in incentives, by comparing them with the changes that took place in the cup.
Responses to the Incentive Change
For each outcome variable, we …rst present the simple di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimator, which is the di¤erence of the di¤erence in means. The e¤ect of the incentive change is then the interaction between league (non-cup) and year. Then, we repeat the analysis controlling for the strength of the teams in the match using their operating budgets, and lastly we add team …xed e¤ects.
O¤ensive E¤ort. Table 2 presents our main evidence on the increase in attacking play. We have four proxies for the attacking play: number of attackers used at the start of the match, shots, shots on goal, and corner kicks.
First, we …nd that there is a large and signi…cant increase in the number of attackers as a result of the change, estimated at 0.41. Considering that 2.08 forwards were used on average before the change, this estimated 20% increase is sizable. Controlling for the budgets of the teams (column II) or team's …xed e¤ects (column III) reduces the coe¢ cient estimates to about 0.28. The evidence from these three speci…cations is nevertheless unambiguous: teams signi…cantly increase, by roughly between 0.28 and 0.41 players per team, the number of attackers they use as a result of the new reward scheme.
We then construct a proxy of o¤ensive or "good" e¤ort using the …rst principal component of corner kicks, shots, and shots on goal. The results are reported in columns IV, V and VI. We see a clear increase in o¤ensive e¤ort, suggesting that the incentive change resulted in an increase in the number of shots, shots on goals, and corner kicks. We also calculated the e¤ects for the individual components of the index and, although not separately statistically signi…cant, they all showed increases of around 10%.
Sabotage. Table 3 reports the impact of the incentive changes on sabotage activities. We study three measures of sabotage:
i. The number of specialists in such activities. We …nd in columns I, II and III that the number of defenders increases from 0.1 to 0.25 depending on the speci…cation. Given that the average pre-change number of defenders is 4, these changes represent an increase of about 2% to 6%. Note that this is one instance where the di¤erences-in-di¤erences reverses the before-after …ndings.
ii. Fouls. The second panel, columns IV, V and VI in Table 3 , performs the same analysis for regular fouls. Recall that this type of fouls represents the large majority of all sabotage activities. The result here is quite conclusive: the incentive change produced a precisely estimated increase in the number of fouls of around 2. Given the pre-change mean of 16.2, the estimate represents approximately a 12.5% increase in the number of fouls as a consequence of the incentive change.
iii. Yellow Cards. Because referees are subject to an upper limit on the number of yellow cards they can give per player (because two yellow cards to the same player in a game causes that player to be expelled), yellow cards may be less sensitive than other measures of sabotage. All the estimates we obtain in columns VII, VIII and IX are positive and of comparable magnitudes. They suggest that yellow cards increase by around 10% as a result of the incentive change, although in this case our estimates are somewhat imprecise.
Overall, we take these results as indicating that teams unambiguously increased the amount of sabotage.
Net E¤ects of Increasing O¤ensive E¤ort and Sabotage on Outcomes. We have found that due to the incentive change, while o¤ensive e¤ort increases so does sabotage. In principle, it is not clear whether these changes may lead to more goals, fewer goals, or to no signi…cant change. Interestingly, we …nd in columns I-III in Table  4 that there is no change in the number of goals after the change in incentives in any of the speci…cations. Hence, the increase in attacking play was not enough, given the increase in sabotage, to increase goals. The e¤ect is quite precisely estimated at around zero.
Columns IV-XII in this table present results for some other outcome measures of interest. The proportion of ties did not decrease, even though such a decrease would be Pareto preferred by both teams. Extra time, which is awarded at the discretion of the referees to compensate for interruptions in play, does increase as a result of the incentive change. Since most interruptions are due to fouls and yellow cards, especially those that cause injuries, this is further, indirect evidence of sabotage. Finally, there still is the question of whether the public preferred the increase in more physical play. Attendance measures this margin. Our …ndings suggest that the incentive change actually decreased attendance. Note that the most complete speci…cation, which controls for the popularity of the teams using a full set of home and visiting team …xed e¤ects, is the one that gives the clearest result. In section 5, we will return to this issue and examine which actions may have led to lower attendance, that is to reducing welfare as perceived by the principal FIFA. We …rst try to get a better understanding of why goals did not change after the change in incentives by investigating the dynamic strategic mechanism underlying the changes in behavior we have documented.
Competition Dynamics: Why Did Sabotage Keep
Goals from Increasing?
We study here the dynamics of the competition using the variables for which there exists information on their timing during the match: player substitutions and goals.
Player Substitutions During the Game. Figures 2A and 2B present graphically the DID estimates of the changes in the number of defenders and attackers by game score. Although any player can defend and attack, changes in strategies during the game are better implemented by substituting in new specialists. Using the evidence on player substitutions during the game, we …nd that more defenders are monotonically used the more a team gets ahead in the score, and more attackers are monotonically used the more a team gets behind. Figure 2A , which shows the impact of the change in the number of defenders by goal score (where the number is measured relative to the number used in a tie) clari…es how teams are adapting their strategy to the new situation. After the incentive change, teams that get ahead in the score by one or two goals increase signi…cantly their deployment of defenders relative to what such deployment was before the rule change. For 1 goal ahead, the test statistic for the equality of the number of defenders is F (1,858)=5.64, p-value: 0.017; while for 2 goals ahead it is F (1,858)=4.26, with pvalue: 0.039. That is, when a team is ahead it deploys a strategy aiming at conserving the score relative to the possibility of scoring more goals. Recall that teams were already using more defenders in the initial line-up. Hence, the change relative to the old reward scheme is even more signi…cant. Figure 2B shows the change in the deployment of the number of attackers by game score, again relative to the number used in a tie. The change goes in the same direction of more conservatism when ahead, and has a similar size. After the incentive change, the team that is ahead deploys .1 fewer attackers than when it is tied, although the drop is not statistically signi…cant (for 1 goal the p-value is 0.310, and for 2 goals it is 0.416).
Likelihood of Scoring and Goal Attempts During the Game. Figures 3A  and 3B report the estimated coe¢ cients of two di¤erent regressions of goals and shots aimed at the opponent's goal. Figure 3A presents the DID estimates of the probability of scoring in a game by game score. Consistent with its increasing defensive stance, the team ahead was less likely to score a goal after the rule change. This change is statistically signi…cant (for 1 goal ahead, the test on the equality of the scoring probablity is 2 (1)=5.46, pvalue:0.019; for 2 goals ahead, 2 (1)=4.09, and p-value: 0.043). Since the probability that the team behind scores a goal in any particular minute is very small, the team that is behind su¤ers only a tiny decrease in the probability of scoring as a result of the increasingly aggressive defensive stance of the team ahead. Yet, the change is transparent.
10 Figure 3B presents additional, indirect evidence on this drop. Since no records exist of shots per minute, the …gure shows the number of shots over the entire match. The behavior is U-shaped: teams take more shots both in matches where they end up behind and in matches where they end up ahead. After the incentive change, the total number of shots taken by a team that ends up losing decreases signi…cantly (for 2 goals, F (1, 797) = 5.42, with p-value: 0.020; for 1 goal F (1, 797) = 7.51, with pvalue: 0.006), while there is no change for the team that ends up winning. Although, of course, the match outcome is endogenous to the number of shots, we …nd that this evidence complements that in the previous …gure.
To summarize, teams ahead use fewer forwards and more defenders after the incentive change, score fewer goals, and allow, overall, a smaller number of shots by their opponents. 10 The estimate for a team behind by 1 goal decreases from 0.002 to 0.00015.
5 Dysfunctional Response vs. Desirable Intensity
It seems reasonable to conclude from the evidence obtained that as a result of the incentive change e¤ort increased, teams engaged in a more intense and physical type of play, and more "dirty" actions took place. Yet, sabotage activities need not be detrimental to the game. That is, it is unclear whether or not this is "bad" from the perspective of the principal. Contrary to the provision of incentives in …rms and other organizations where any amount of sabotage is undesirable by the principal, in a sports context some strong physical play may be desirable. For instance, it is often argued that physical play and brawls are desired by the public in ice hockey. This, despite FIFA's stated purpose for the incentive change, could also be the case in soccer.
Here we study the extent to which the public dislikes dirty play. To do this, we exploit a useful feature of league play: all teams are allocated to all stadiums, until they each play in every other team's home stadium. This feature allows us to tease out the e¤ect of playing against a dirtier rival, i.e., one which undertakes more sabotage actions, on attendance. Table 5 studies the e¤ect of playing against a dirtier team at one's home stadium, that is the response of fans to the expected dirtiness of the visiting team. We proxy for this using the average number of fouls, yellow cards and red cards by the visitor during the season in question. We also compute an index of sabotage propensity by a team using a factor analysis on the matrix of these three variables and picking the …rst principal component. The results show a signi…cant decrease in attendance when being visited by dirtier teams, even after controlling for the losing or winning record of the teams in the match and other variables.
While traditionally most of the literature on incentives has emphasized the trade-o¤ between risks and incentives, empirical evidence for the importance of such trade-o¤ is tenuous (Prendergast, 2002) . A more modern view (e.g., Lazear, 1989 , Hölmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 , 1994 , Baker, 1992 emphasizes the limits placed on the strength of incentives by the di¢ culty in measuring output correctly and the costs that may be incurred when, as a reaction to stronger incentives, agents re-optimize away from the principal's objective.
We see our paper as providing a strong empirical endorsement for this view. We …nd that an increase in the reward for winning increased, counter to FIFA's intentions, the amount of sabotage e¤ort undertaken by teams. Although there is also an increase in attacking e¤ort, no changes take place in the main variable where change was intended, goals scored. The mechanism underlying these patterns is increasing conservatism: teams try to preserve their lead by freezing the game, particularly by using a larger number of defenders. The decrease in attendance we …nd means that stronger incentives turn out to be detrimental to the game.
Although theoretical research warns about the possible detrimental incentive effects of increasing the spread of rewards in a tournament when workers can engage in sabotage, the theory has remained untested in the literature. Workers engaged in promotion tournaments may indeed bad-mouth their colleagues and actively prevent them from achieving good results by withholding information and other means. But they will typically do their best to conceal their e¤orts. For this reason, evidence on sabotage activities is, by its nature, at best anecdotal. In the setting we have studied, however, both productive and destructive actions can be observed. Moreover, we can study the e¤ects of an exogenous change in incentives using a control group to eliminate any e¤ects unrelated to the incentive change. These elements allow us to provide the …rst explicit empirical test of worker-incentive problems in a natural multi-task setting, where tasks can be productive and destructive.
Table 1 -Before-After Estimates
This table reports differences in offensive and defensive effort and selected match-level statistics in league soccer matches before and after the FIFA incentive change. For the offensive and defensive measures the unit of observation is a team within a match. For the match outcomes the unit of observation is a match except for goals that it is a team within a match. Attendance is measured as the fraction of available seating that was occupied. Where appropriate standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for clustering on match. * denotes significant at the two-tailed 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Note: This table reports differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of a change in scoring incentives on the number of attackers initially deployed by a team and an offensive index. The offensive index is the first principal component of the number of shots, shots on goal, and corner kicks made by a team. The unit of observation is a team within a match. The first difference compares matches in seasons before and after the incentive change and the second difference compares matches in the cup tournament to league play. Standard errors clustered on matches are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Offensive

Attackers
Offensive Index Note: This table reports differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the change in incentives on the number of defenders initially deployed by a team, the number of fouls committed by the team, and the number of yellow cards received by the team. The unit of observation is a team within a match. The first difference compares matches in seasons before and after the rule change and the second difference compares matches in the cup tournament to league play. Standard errors clustered on matches are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Attendance
Note: This table reports differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the incentive change on the number of goals scored by a team, the probability of a tie match, the number of extra minutes added to the match by referees, and match attendance. Attendance is measured as the proportion of the available seats in the stadium that were occupied. The first difference compares matches in seasons before and after the rule change and the second difference compares matches in the cup tournament to league play. Standard errors clustered on matches are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. For columns IV-VI, estimation using a probit model generates comparable results.
Tie Indicator Extra Time Goals Scored
Team in match Match Match Note: These figures report the estimated coefficients from a regression of the number of defenders ( Figure 2A ) and attackers ( Figure 2B ) on an indicator variable for the incentive change interacted with indicators for the number of goals ahead or behind as well as team, minute, year, cup game, and match fixed effects. The unit of observation is one minute of play by a team in a match. The regressions contain 154,620 observations with an R² of 0.226 ( Figure 2A ) and 0.228 ( Figure 2B ). The reported coefficients are relative to the number of defenders (Figure 2A ) or attackers ( Figure 2B ) employed during a tie. For instance, the point (1,.077) on "Incentive Change" in Figure  2A means that after the change teams on average had .077 more attackers on the field during minutes when they were ahead in the score than during minutes when the game was tied. Similarly for Figure 2B . When teams are 1 or 2 goals behind, F-tests using standard errors clustered on match fail to reject the equality of coefficients pre-and post-rule change in either figure. When teams are 1 or 2 goals ahead, the pre-and post-rule change coefficients are statistically different at the .05 percent level in Figure 2A but not statistically different in Figure 2B . observations with an R² of .108. The reported coefficients are relative to the number shots on goal made in games that were tied. For win margins of 1 and 2 goals, F-tests using standard errors clustered on match fail to reject the equality of coefficients pre-and post-rule change. For loss margins of 1 and 2 goals, the equality of coefficients can be rejected at the 5% level.
Note: This figure reports the estimated coefficients from probit regressions of an indicator equal to one in minutes in which a team scored on an indicator variable for the incentive change interacted with indicators for the number of goals ahead or behind as well as team, minute, year, and cup game fixed effects. The unit of observation is one minute of play by a team in a match. The regression contains 153,959 observations. The probit coefficients have been transformed to marginal effects at the mean of each indicator and are reported relative to ties. The point (1,.048) on "No Incentive Change," for example, means that before the incentive change teams on average were 4.8% more likely to score a goal during minutes when they were ahead than during minutes when the game was tied. When teams are 1 or 2 goals behind, F-tests using standard errors clustered on match fail to reject the equality of coefficients pre-and post-rule change. When teams are 1 or 2 goals ahead, the pre-and post-rule change coefficients are statistically different at the .05 percent level. 
